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CASE COMMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-CoMMERCE CLAUSE-SUPERSEDURE o
STATE REGULATION BY THE FEDERAL MOTOR CARRIER Aar.-Petition-
er, manufacturer in Tennessee of asphalt roofing products, trans-
ported to Arkansas customers by contract carriers, sought to enjoin
in an Arkansas court the application to the carriers of an Arkansas
act requiring the obtaining of a permit by any "contract carrier by
motor vehicle" in Arkansas. Ark. Acts 1941, No. 367, §§ 5, 11. The
Arkansas court reversed a decree granting an injunction, see Fry
Roofing Co. v. Wood, 219 Ark. 553, 244 S.W.2d 147 (1952), ruling
in favor of the state public service commission on the question
whether it might insist on the procurement of a local permit as
to carriers situated as were petitioner's haulers and operating with-
out any permit from the Interstate Commerce Commission, and
rejecting petitioner's contention that the state requirement was
within an area of regulation occupied and preempted by the
federal Motor Carrier Act. 49 STAT. 543 (1935), 49 U.S.C. § 301
et seq. (1946). On certiorari, held, affirmed. The Arkansas public
service commission could validly enforce the permit requirement,
"in the absence of any attempt to attach any burdensome conditions
to the grant of such a permit." Fry Roofing Co. v. Wood, 73 Sup.
Ct. 204 (1952) (5-4 decision).
Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting, appears to accede to peti-
tioner's claim that the state act was ipso facto invalid in requiring
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a "Certificate of Necessity and Convenience", as trenching on a
matter where uniformity is required, citing Buck v. Kuykendall,
267 U.S. 307 (1925). Bradley v. Public Utilities Comm'n of Ohio,
289 U.S. 92 (1933), in which denial of such a certificate on the
ground of traffic congestion was sustained, is opposed to any such
blanket proposition; and the state public service commission dis-
claimed discretion to withhold a permit to the carriers in question
on any ground relating to the supply of transportation services
such as Buck v. Kuykendall, supra, involved. The more difficult
problem remaining is. that of supersedure, of discovering the effect
of the Motor Carrier Act upon the state regulation. The federal
act gives the I.C.C. complete authority over contract carriers, mak-
ing it mandatory, inter alia, for them to obtain a permit from the
I.C.C. Mr. Justice Douglas concludes that "Congress has preempted
the field, precluding both inconsistent and overlapping state
regulations."
State courts have interpreted the Motor Carrier Act is not
entirely preempting the field, recognizing that the I.C.C. was given
exclusive jurisdiction to classify carriers, to consider their applica-
tions for permits, to regulate the same, etc.; but holding that this
delegation of authority to it did not supersede state statutes requir-
ing the procurement of a certificate of registration as a part of the
police regulations for the promotion of public safety, and that
state and federal law could be cooperatively applied in the absence
of conflict. State v. Florida R.R. Comm'n, 123 Fla. 345, 166 So.
841 (1936); Lowe v. Stoutamire, 123 Fla. 135, 166 So. 310 (1936);
Southwestern Greyhound Lines v. R.R. Comm'n of Texas, 128 Tex.
560, 99 S.W.2d 263, 109 A.L.R. 1235 (1936). Cf. L. & L. Freight
Lines v. Douglas, 124 Fla. 696, 169 So. 370 (1936). The Motor
Carrier Act did not supersede a statute requiring the state com-
missioner to consider traffic conditions in reviewing an application
for a permit by an interstate carrier. Ex parte Truelock, 139 Tex.
Cr. R. 365, 140 S.W.2d 167 (1940); Railroad Comm'n v. Loving,
128 S.W.2d 845 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939). Contra: Dunlap v. Dixie
Greyhound Lines, 178 Tenn. 532, 160 S.W.2d 413 (1942).
The United States Supreme Court Court, too, refused to apply
the Act as an entire ouster of the states from control over the
affected carriers. Maurer v. Hamilton, 309 U.S. 598 (1940), con-
strued § 225 of the federal act which empowered the I.C.C. to
"Investigate and report on the need for Federal regulation" as to
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size-weight limitations on motor vehicles, in the light of the statu-
tory context and history, as reserving to the states the authority to
regulate the "sizes and weight" of motor vehicles and sustained a
Pennsylvania statute prohibiting the carrying of one vehicle over
the cab of another, in its application to an interstate common
carrier. A New Hampshire statute prescribing maximum hours
of service of employees of contract carriers on the state highways
was held valid and not superseded by the Motor Carrier Act prior
to the effective date of an I.C.C. regulation, even though the Act
expressly authorized the I.C.C. to "establish. . . maximum hours
of service and employment." H. P. Welch Co. v. New Hampshire,
306 U.S. 79 (1939). The state held its statutory requirements un-
enforceable after the effective date of the I.C.C. regulation. H. P.
Welch Co. v. New Hampshire, 91 N.H. 328, 18 A.2d 836 (1941).
Neither the majority nor the dissent evidences a disposition to
recede from the holdings in either H. P. Welch Co. v. New Hamp-
shire, supra, or Maurer v. Hamilton, supra; the disagreement is as
to the interpretation of Columbia Terminals Co. v. Lambert, 309
U.S. 620 (1940), analogous to the present case, in that it also
involved the enforceability of a state permit requirement as to
interstate carriers, where the Court dismissed the petitioner's com-
plaint, agreeing with the lower court's constitutional holding, see
Columbia Terminals Co. v. Lambert, 30 F. Supp. 28 (E.D. Mo.
1939), that the Missouri statute was valid and not superseded where
the I.C.C. had not undertaken the regulation of the carriers in
question. Mr. Justice Black in his majority opinion placed primary
reliance on the above case to support the proposition that "a state
can regulate so long as no undue burden is imposed on interstate
commerce, and that a mere requirement for a permit is not such a
burden." Mr. Justice Douglas regarded the case as inapplicable
because the I.C.C. had ruled the particular operations therein were
not covered by the Motor Carrier Act. However, the Supreme
Court dismissed the case on the merits, and the majority's interpre-
tation seems to be correct; for, if the dissent's position had been
followed, it would have been more appropriately dismissed for lack
of jurisdiction.
Moreover, the choice of supporting cases for citation in the
memorandum opinion of Columbia Terminals Co. v. Lambert,
supra, is suggestive. Eichholz v. Public Service Comm'n, 306 U.S.
268 (1939), is indeed reconcilable with the position that the critical
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problem is whether or not the carrier has an I.C.C. permit, for
state authority to revoke a local permit to do interstate commerce
was there not to be superseded as to a carrier whose application
for a permit was pending before the I.C.C., the carrier having
carried on intrastate commerce evasively without the necessary
local permit. H. P. Welch Co. v. New Hampshire, supra, however,
involved a carrier clearly within the coverage of the Motor Carrier
Act. Citation of the two cases in conjunction, in deciding Columbia
Terminals Co. v. Lambert, supra, indicates a Supreme Court under-
standing in line with the interpretation Mr. Justice Black attributes
to that case.
In view of the result reached in Columbia Terminals Co. v.
Lambert, supra, and of the previous holdings cited, the majority
view appears correct and consistent with prior authority; for the
permit requirement was no more than a device for the orderly ad-
ministration of the state's highways. However, the I.C.C. has now
issued regulations dealing with the lessor-driver relation, which
have been approved, see American Trucking "Ass'ns v. United
States, 73 Sup. Ct. 307 (1953); so there still may be uncertainty as
to the precise limits of the state's regulatory powers over contract
carriers within the ambit of the regulated relationship.
G. D. H. S.
CONTRACTS-INSURANCE-INTERPRETATION OF WORD "WARe".-P'S
deceased husband was insured by D under an insurance contract
which included a provision for double idemnity if death resulted
solely from accidental means. This clause further provided, how-
ever, that the company should not be liable for the additional death
benefit if death resulted by reason of "military, air or naval service
in time of war" and that this provision for double indemnity would
immediately terminate if the insured should at any time, "volun-
tarily or involuntarily, engage in military, air or naval service in
time of war." The insured, called to service, was killed accidentally
while enroute to camp for training some three months after com-
mencement of the Korean action. D attempted to invoke the ter-
mination clause. Held, that the word "war" is ambiguous in that
it does not distinguish between declared and undeclared war and
the policy will be construed most strongly against the insurer.
Therefore, the termination clause was inoperative. Harding v.
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